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INTRODUCTION
In Jane Austen’s novel Sense and Sensibility, Mr. Henry Dashwood
leaves his entire estate to his son, John, and on his deathbed, he elicits
a promise that John will provide comfortably for his stepmother and his
three half-sisters, Elinor, Marianne, and Margaret. In the flush of his
new wealth, John thinks he should settle £1000 on each of his sisters.
But as soon as John mentions it to his wife, Fanny, she convinces him,
through impeccable logic, that Mr. Dashwood certainly didn’t intend
* Copyright © 2020 Danaya C. Wright. Clarence J. TeSelle Professor of Law,
University of Florida, Levin College of Law. I want to thank the ACTEC Foundation for
its generous support of this research and for sponsoring the ACTEC Conference at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law. I also want to thank the many inspiring
scholars at that conference upon whose work I greatly depend, including Naomi Cahn,
David Horton, Reid Weisbord, Bridget Crawford, Alyssa DiRusso, Jeffrey Pennell, Adam
Hirsch, Gary Spitko, Adam Hofri-Winogradow, Russell James, Alberto Lopez,
Alexander Boni-Saenz, Emily Poppe, and the amazing crew of the UC Davis Law Review.
I also want to thank Carla Spivak whose dedication to critical trusts and estates
scholarship is inspiring, and to Laura Rosenbury, Lee-ford Tritt, Grayson McCouch,
and Dennis Calfee of U.F. Law School, and finally Rachel Feldman, Sophia Serrao, and
Alex Coe for their dedicated research assistance.
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that John would actually give his half-sisters any money; surely all the
money he inherited was necessary to provide comfortably for their own
son Harry. Better, John would be doing his father’s bidding by helping
them move to a small house, sending some fish and game when the
season was right, and perhaps making a little present of furniture now
and then. With his wife’s help, John Dashwood saved himself £3000 per
year and any guilt from failing to honor his father’s deathbed wishes. As
Fanny explained,
Altogether, they will have five hundred a-year amongst them,
and what on earth can four women want for more than that?—
They will live so cheap! Their housekeeping will be nothing at
all. They will have no carriage, no horses, and hardly any
servants; they will keep no company, and can have no expenses
of any kind! Only conceive how comfortable they will be! Five
hundred a year! I am sure I cannot imagine how they will spend
half of it; and as to your giving them more, it is quite absurd to
think of it. They will be much more able to give you something.1
Unfortunately for the girls, on his deathbed Mr. Dashwood had placed
too much faith in John’s oral promise to care for them. Next, the widow
and her three daughters are walking out the gates of the only home they
had known for their new life of poverty just as John, Fanny, and Harry
are driving their carriages into the family estate. The dynamics of wealth
have changed very little since Jane Austen’s day, as the wealthy are able
to pass on their wealth to build more wealth, while those with little
wealth scrimp and save for a lifetime only to see their meager
inheritances often lost through transfers to the next generation.2
1

JANE AUSTEN, SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 18-19 (Little, Brown & Co. 1910) (1811).
See William R. Emmons et al., The Financial Returns from College Across
Generations: Large but Unequal, in DEMOGRAPHICS OF WEALTH (2018 SERIES) 1, 5 (2018)
(identifying the “head-start effect” and noting that “[w]hatever a family head’s
education level, being non-Hispanic white, being over 40 and/or having collegeeducated parents typically boosts income and wealth compared to families without
these demographic characteristics (singly or in combination). The median college
graduate family with all of the most advantageous inherited demographics — white,
aged 40-61, college grad parents — had three times as much income and six times as
much wealth as the median family overall”); Ray Boshara, Born on 3rd Base? The Effects
of Head Starts and College on Family Wealth, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/april/born-third-base-effect-headstarts-college-family-wealth [https://perma.cc/Z83W-QLMR]; Laura Feiveson & John
Sabelhaus, How Does Intergenerational Wealth Transmission Affect Wealth
Concentration? , FED. RES. SYS.: FEDS NOTES (June 1, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.
gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/how-does-intergenerational-wealth-transmission-affectwealth-concentration-20180601.htm [https://perma.cc/G9N8-2DVN] (exploring how the
2

2020]

What Happened to Grandma’s House

2605

We all know that those with wealth are better situated to maintain
and grow that wealth than those without.3 The adage that it takes money
to make money is more true today than in nearly a century.4 We also
know that the tax and probate laws help those with wealth keep it by
giving breaks on transfer taxes, capital gains taxes, and even mortgage
deductions that the person of modest means can hardly imagine.5 A
major tool for growing wealth in high-wealth families is careful estate
planning that protects assets from dissipation by spendthrift
beneficiaries and channels control over wealth to those who will focus
on maintenance rather than utilization.6 Much of the high-wealth
exceptionalism, as Professor Allison Tait refers to it, is a result of
favorable laws allowing wealthy families to manage their wealth
through a completely independent financial system, far away from the
prying eyes of the tax commissioner, the securities regulator, and even

bulk of inheritances and inter vivos gifts flow to families that already have substantial
resources).
3 See, e.g., THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW
WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 4-5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004) (arguing that wealth
and inheritance play a role in economic inequality); Thomas W. Mitchell, Growing
Inequality and Racial Economic Gaps, 56 HOW. L.J. 849, 850-52 (2013) (arguing that
changes to public policy must be made to reduce economic inequality); Beverly Moran
& Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role of Law and the Legal
System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1219, 1219-21 (2007) (discussing how the U.S. legal
system creates and maintains wealth disparity based on race); Daria Roithmayr, Them
That Has, Gets, 27 MISS. C.L. REV. 373, 374-75 (2008) (discussing how “positive
feedback loops” in social institutions play a role in racial and economic inequality).
4 See Carla Spivack, Broken Links: A Critique of Formal Equality in Inheritance Law,
2019 WIS. L. REV. 191, 194-96 (2019); Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of
Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States 1-5 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19843, 2014), https://www.nber.org/
papers/w19843 [https://perma.cc/6MEK-CXKV]; V. Joseph Hotz et al., The Role of
Parental Wealth and Income in Financing Children’s College Attendance and its
Consequences 1-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25144, 2018),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w25144 [https://perma.cc/5U6L-RNWW]; Boshara, supra
note 2.
5 Felix B. Chang, Asymmetries in the Generation and Transmission of Wealth, 79
OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 81-86 (2018); see Naomi Cahn, Dismantling the Trusts and Estates
Canon, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 165, 175-76 (2019) [hereinafter Dismantling Trusts]
(explaining how trusts and estates law is generally focused on advancing the interests
of the wealthy).
6 Chang, supra note 5, at 76-77, 99-100; see also Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel
Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized
Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 563-65 (2016); Daniel J. Amato, Note, The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly: The Political Economy and Unintended Consequences of Perpetual
Trusts, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 637, 646 (2013); Feiveson & Sabelhaus, supra note 2.
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the courts as they establish family foundations, family offices, and
family constitutions solely to maintain and grow their wealth.7
But for the rest of us in the 99%,8 we generally work hard most of our
lives trying to raise our kids, put them through college, get them
established, and then hopefully save enough for a modest retirement.
And for well over 50% of the population, these goals are completely
unattainable. Counting debt, the net wealth of the bottom 50% is $0.9
Most people will die with no or such small estates, which are likely to
be so fractionated when they pass at death, that the heirs or beneficiaries
take inheritances that are perhaps able to pay off some credit card debt,
but are certainly not enough to make a down payment on a house or
put a child through college. Unfortunately for the bottom half of the
population, the probate and succession laws are not set up to help
maintain and grow wealth, but in fact contribute to dissipation and loss
of wealth at each generation.10
Studies have shown that intergenerational wealth transmission
significantly affects wealth concentration and the growing wealth gap.11
Of the two million households that received an inheritance or a
substantial inter vivos gift each year, roughly half are small, under
$50,000, while transfers of $1 million or more account for only 2% of
the transfers. Yet, those 2% of inheritances over $1 million comprise
40% of total wealth transferred.12 As scholars continue to examine the
role of inheritance in the alarming wealth gap, few are focusing on how
the laws of intestacy might exacerbate the gap by leading to greater
wealth loss for the bottom half.13 In this study, I explore what happens
to the family home, usually the largest single-value asset of those in the
bottom 90%. The data, from 225 testate and intestate estates, are

7 Allison Anna Tait, The Law of High-Wealth Exceptionalism, 71 ALA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3406070 [https://perma.cc/KU62-RD4N]).
8 It is actually the 99.9%, as the top 0.1% controls significant amounts of wealth.
Between 1986 and 2012, almost half of U.S. wealth accumulation benefitted the top
0.1%. Saez & Zucman, supra note 6, at 521.
9 Wealth
Distribution in the United States in 2016, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/203961/wealth-distribution-for-the-us/ (last visited
Jan. 30, 2020) [https://perma.cc/P8CG-DV8Z].
10 See Spivack, supra note 4, at 202-07; Chang, supra note 5, at 94-98.
11 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 5, at 83-86; Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H.
Summers, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89
J. POL. ECON. 706, 730 (1981).
12 Feiveson & Sabelhaus, supra note 2.
13 See Spivack, supra note 4, at 194-95 (discussing the link between inheritance laws
and inequality).
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sobering, as the lower-value homes of the intestate decedents are
significantly more likely to be sold at below fair market value or lost to
foreclosure or tax sale. And if they aren’t, they are likely to be
partitioned into smaller shares for recipients who seem less able to
leverage their inheritances into building their own wealth. Through an
analysis of the real property assets of these decedents, we can see in
vivid detail how wealth is lost for some families and how it is gained for
others.
I.

THE WEALTH GAP, INHERITANCE, AND REAL PROPERTY

Even as the income gap between different demographics has
narrowed, the wealth gap has grown in ways that are quite alarming. In
the United States, over 75% of wealth is controlled by the top 10% of
the population.14 The top 0.1% controls 22% of average wealth.15 The
wealth of the typical Black or Latino family is between 10-20% of the
wealth of a typical white family.16 The 2008 recession hit Black and
Latino family households much harder than white families. Between
2005 and 2009, median white household net worth declined by 16%
while Black and Hispanic households declined by 53% and 66%
respectively.17 The gender wealth gap is also notable as women receive
lower wages, take a greater hit to their earning potential by taking time
off to care for children, parents, and spouses, and may be more risk
averse in their investment strategies.18 Some scholars estimate that U.S.
wealth would decline by as much as 51% if inter-generational

14 Saez & Zucman, supra note 6, at 552; see also Erez Aloni, The Marital Wealth Gap,
93 WASH. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2018).
15 Saez & Zucman, supra note 6, at 552.
16 Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 381-82; see also Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo,
How Wealth Inequality has Changed in the U.S. Since the Great Recession, by Race,
Ethnicity and Income, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/11/01/how-wealth-inequality-has-changed-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recessionby-race-ethnicity-and-income/ [https://perma.cc/NVU8-2JE2]; Rakesh Kochhar &
Anthony Cilluffo, Key Findings on the Rise in Income Inequality Within America’s Racial
and Ethnic Groups, PEW RES. CTR. (July 12, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/07/12/key-findings-on-the-rise-in-income-inequality-within-americasracial-and-ethnic-groups/ [https://perma.cc/7M32-YTAA].
17 Mitchell, supra note 3, at 859-60.
18 Reshma Kapadia, The Stubborn Wealth Gap Between Men and Women, BARRON’S
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-stubborn-wealth-gap-betweenmen-and-women-1524099601 [https://perma.cc/77DD-SSHU]; see Gwendolyn Griffith,
The Evolution of Women’s Wealth: Implications for Wealth Planners, ESTATE PLANNING
CLIENT STRATEGIES (2014), 2014 WL 4160088, at *7.
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inheritances were eliminated.19 And although there are many reasons
for the wealth gap, from income inequality, racism, housing
segregation, and tax policy, to risk-averse tendencies and lack of
education about how to protect and grow wealth, intergenerational
wealth transfers permissible by succession laws certainly contribute to
the divide.20 While trust law enables some to shelter wealth from
consumption and taxes, intestacy law contributes to dissipation
through fractionation and administrative costs.21 And time exacerbates
the wealth gap if parental wealth and behavior create positive feedback
loops for white or male wealth, and negative feedback loops for Black
and Hispanic or female wealth.
Scholars have argued that two of the main factors in the widening
wealth gap are the effects of intergenerational wealth transfers through
inheritance and homeownership.22 As Lynnise Phillips Pantin explains:
Fifty years after the Civil Rights Movement, the wealth gap is
widening. The enormous growth is due in large part to the
effects
of
intergenerational
wealth
transfers
and
homeownership. Wealth and real property, unlike income,
accumulates in value and may be passed from generation to
generation. Wealth transfers between generations contribute to
the modern wealth gap because wealthy parents and
grandparents can pass their wealth on to children and
grandchildren through inheritance. Black families have lower
wealth levels than White families. In a joint report, the Institute
for Policy Studies and the Corporation for Economic
Development, found that over the last thirty years the average
wealth of White families had grown by eighty-four percent, 1.2
times the rate of growth for the Latino population and three
times the rate of growth for the Black population. Twenty
percent of wealth can be attributed to formal and informal gifts
19 See Feiveson & Sabelhaus, supra note 2 (estimating that intergenerational
transfers account for 26% of total wealth and then applying a real interest rate of 5%).
See generally Kotlikoff & Summers, supra note 11, at 730 (“Intergenerational transfers
appear to be the major element determining wealth accumulation in the United
States.”).
20 See Feiveson & Sabelhaus, supra note 2; see also Cahn, supra note 5, at 175-78;
Chang, supra note 5, at 75; Spivack, supra note 4, at 194-95.
21 See, e.g., Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of
Succession, 89 OR. L. REV. 453, 494-95 (2010); Amato, supra note 6, at 638-41.
22 A college education is also a key indicator of wealth accumulation. See The Rising
Cost of Not Going to College, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 11, 2014), https://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/2014/02/11/the-rising-cost-of-not-going-to-college/ [https://perma.
cc/BD9E-74VN].
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from family members. Moreover, wealthier parents have access
to better communities, better schools, and richer social
networks, which can lead in turn to their children building
more wealth than children lacking these advantages. White
Americans are more likely to receive an inheritance than Black
Americans.
Despite the collapse of the housing market during the Great
Recession, homeownership is still the greatest source of wealth
in the United States. Black homeownership lags behind White
homeownership. Only forty-one percent of Black Americans
own their homes, compared with seventy-one percent of White
Americans. Black Americans not only build less wealth through
a low rate of homeownership, but home values in segregated
communities of color are lower than in those of White
communities, resulting in Black homeowners earning a smaller
return on their investment. Further, because they are less likely
to inherit money or receive financial assistance from their
families, it takes Black people longer to buy homes, and they
also have smaller down payments than their White
counterparts.23
While there are many ways we could address the widening wealth gap
through tax, trust law, housing, zoning, education, and other policies
— and we should do so — we should also examine whether our probate
and succession laws are exacerbating the problem and, if so, whether
they are amenable to change. For many people of modest wealth, death
and tax time are the only moments when they interact with a legal
system that could potentially assist them in protecting their wealth. In
fact, if probate courts were more like family-law courts, assisting with
enforcement of child support payments and ensuring that the best
interests of children are protected, the probate process could be an
opportunity to do wealth planning that protects and salvages wealth
from generation to generation rather than a risky period when it could
just as easily be lost as not.
In early modern England, the ecclesiastical courts managed probate
of non-real property and, with the help of accountants and apparitors,
ecclesiastical judges would preside over the succession of property with
an eye toward avoiding the “utter undoing and spoyling of many

23 Lynnise E. Phillips Pantin, The Wealth Gap and the Racial Disparities in the Startup
Ecosystem, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 436-37 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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fatherlesse, and friendlesse children.”24 The process was much more
hands-on by neighbors and court officials to ensure that the widow and
the children would be as comfortable as possible.25 In today’s probate
avoidance world, however, succession of property can be entirely in the
shadows with no judicial oversight and no accounting, as all property
can be set up to pass through non-probate will substitutes. This secrecy
leaves many heirs to wonder if they are entitled to an inheritance, and
often they do not even know to ask.26
As we have moved to a more private process for property succession,
a privacy sought out by the wealthy and exploited by people who want
to keep those family skeletons in the closet, those who are most
vulnerable to wealth dissipation are often forced into court-supervised
probate with little likelihood of a good outcome. Without self-interested
heirs and devisees willing to do the work of property administration,
wealth can be easily lost or converted, and deserving beneficiaries are
left with a distaste for the probate system that is exacerbated from
generation to generation.27 Moreover, distaste for the probate system
can also lead to skepticism or downright hostility to lawyers and the
seemingly needless cost of estate planning. But lack of planning leaves
many at the bottom of the economic spectrum forced into probate and
application of the default rules of intestacy.
Although intestate distribution schemes are intended to replicate the
most likely intentions of decedents, they use a very broad brush to
distribute property in families that may have unique needs and
circumstances.28 Intestacy is not a good estate plan for a variety of
reasons, not least of which is the likelihood of fractionation, partition,
or sale that results from intestate properties passing to multiple heirs.29

24 AMY LOUISE ERICKSON, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 37
(1993) (quoting HENRY SWINBURNE, A TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS (1590)).
25 See id. at 33, 35-36.
26 See Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical Study of
How People Approach the Wealth Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 325, 328-30 (2015).
27 See id. at 331-32 (arguing that the private ordering of the wealth transfer process
should evolve to reflect the needs of diverse twenty-first century families).
28 In a study of nearly 500 wills, most deviated from the default rules of intestate
succession by leaving children unequal shares. See Danaya C. Wright & Beth Sterner,
Honoring Probable Intent in Intestacy: An Empirical Assessment of the Default Rules and the
Modern Family, 42 ACTEC L.J. 341, 368, 377 (2017).
29 See Spivack, supra note 4, at 202-07; see also Partition of Heirs Property Act, UNIF. LAW
COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=
50724584-e808-4255-bc5d-8ea4e588371d (last visited Feb. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
K52A-7XL2] (listing status of state legislation related to the Uniform Partition of Heirs
Property Act).
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Lack of estate planning leaves property vulnerable during a perhaps
lengthy period of incapacity, and probate involves administrative costs
and delays in settling property or retitling it. These delays can lead to
deterioration, loss of real property through tax sales and foreclosures,
and the disappearance of movable property. Intestacy also cannot be
fine-tuned to provide for the neediest heirs or those who helped out in
old age by providing unequal shares or by giving different whole items
of property to different heirs. And, of course, if a decedent has not
created an estate plan, she cannot name a preferred personal
representative who will be fair and efficient in administering the
estate.30
There is no question that planning for the succession of one’s
property can help avoid the potential for wealth dissipation by putting
it into a trust, imposing limits on access for spendthrift descendants,
and using mechanisms that avoid the costs and delays of probate.31 For
the very wealthy, a trust also can help minimize transfer taxes.32 But
even for the rest of us, avoiding probate alone can help preserve wealth
by titling property so that it passes quickly and easily to the beneficiary,
without delays that can lead to its deterioration.33 And planning ahead
so that assets don’t have to be sold quickly in order to pay fractional
shares can also help. Although parents rarely want to treat their children
unequally, it may be better for their estates if they give the house to one
child, rather than split the assets equally in a way that is going to require

30 The majority of people appoint family members to be personal representatives of
their estates. See Reid Kress Weisbord, Fiduciary Authority and Liability in Probate
Estates: An Empirical Analysis, 53 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2561, 2589 (2020). The vast majority
accept the appointment. See id. at 2590. The ability to choose the family member who
will be the most responsible is vitally important if there are heirs or beneficiaries who
will procrastinate and not administer the estate in a timely manner, or who will do so
unevenly, and provide grounds for will challenges. See id. at 2589 (“The appointment
of an estate fiduciary is arguably the most important administrative term in a will
because . . . the position comes with great power and responsibility.”).
31 See Cahn, Dismantling Trusts, supra note 5, at 187-88; Amato, supra note 6, at
666-70.
32 See Wendy C. Gerzog, Solutions to the Sexist QTIP Provisions, 35 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 97, 125 (2000); see also Thomas Piketty, Property, Inequality, and Taxation:
Reflections on Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 68 TAX L. REV. 631, 631 (2015)
(discussing optimal tax policy to combat wealth inequality).
33 Probate can be entirely avoided through the relatively simple use of transfer-ondeath beneficiary designations in life insurance, securities and bank accounts, and even
for real property. See Danaya C. Wright, Beneficiary Deeds for Real Estate: Transfer-onDeath, Lady Bird, and Enhanced Life Estate Deeds, in POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (M.A.
Wolf, ed.) (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Beneficiary Deeds].
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partition and/or sale.34 Where the family home is the largest single asset,
people struggle with how to pass it to the next generation, usually
accepting that it will be sold and the proceeds split equally. And this
may be the best result for some families, especially if the kids are grown,
have kids of their own, live afar, and already own their own homes. For
those in the solid middle class, an inheritance from the sale of grandma’s
house can easily be put into savings to be used for the grandkids’ college
or to make a down payment on a home for a child moving into an
expensive housing market.
For those not in the middle class, however, grandma’s house might
be put to better use if it was retained and rented out to generate an
income stream.35 Or perhaps a child or grandchild who lives nearby
could use it and thereby not have to pay rent. But property, especially
real property, that passes through intestacy risks being fractionated and
sold, often yielding a fairly small inheritance for heirs who could really
use the boost of wealth at this point in their lives.36 For those who are
struggling to get by, an inheritance may keep the creditors at bay, but it
rarely provides enough to put away, invest, or save in order to begin
building wealth, and when it is dissipated needlessly through the
probate process, it is even less likely to provide that necessary nest egg.37
All this is to say that people do not go into the probate process equally
34 See Spivack, supra note 4, at 204-07; see also Thomas W. Mitchell et al., Forced
Sale Risk: Class, Race, and the “Double Discount,” 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 591 (2010).
35 Of course, grandma cannot require that her successors not alienate the home, as
that would be an unlawful restraint on alienation. But she could put it into a trust with
an instruction that the house be used to generate income or provide a residence for
family members as long as doing so is in the best interests of some subset of
beneficiaries. That is certainly what wealthy families do, like the Kennedy and Bush
families. See Jay Root, George P. Bush’s Secret Mansion Is Financed by an Undisclosed Loan
from Texas Donor’s Bank, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2018, 12:00 AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/02/16/george-p-bushs-secret-mansion-financedundisclosed-loan-texas-donor/ [https://perma.cc/4DVC-96DJ]; Carl O’Donnell, How
The $1 Billion Kennedy Family Fortune Defies Death And Taxes, FORBES (Jul. 8, 2014, 9:45
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlodonnell/2014/07/08/how-the-1-billion-kennedyfamily-fortune-defies-death-and-taxes-3/#728d3d284e4a [https://perma.cc/LA6N-6VFV].
36 See Feiveson & Sabelhaus, supra note 2, at tbl.1. As noted in the discussion of
Table 4 infra, the median real property inheritance for intestate heirs was less than onethird ($30,000) the real property inheritance for testate heirs ($100,000), which
confirms Feiveson and Sabelhaus’s findings that most inheritances are less than
$50,000. With intestate decedents being nearly twenty years younger than their testate
counterparts, their heirs are going to be younger, and younger adults are less likely than
older adults to have earned significant wealth.
37 Feiveson and Sabelhaus show that 56% of inherited wealth passes to recipients
who are already in the top 10% of the population by wealth, while only 8% of inherited
wealth passes to those in the bottom half. Id. at fig.5.
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and they generally come out even more unequally. Thus, if we want to
lessen the wealth gap, one focus should be on strategies to preserve
wealth from generation to generation for lower-wealth families. Perhaps
changes to the laws of intestacy as well as the probate process can also
help.
If studies are accurate that inheritances constitute as much as 50% of
U.S. wealth, and that the family home is the largest single asset of most
decedents, then examining what happens to the family home at the
death of the homeowner can identify vectors of influence to reduce the
dissipation of wealth that often occurs at death. To better understand
how the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, I undertook an
empirical study of testate and intestate estates probated in Alachua
County, Florida, during the year 2013. And besides examining how the
property was disposed of by the decedent and to whom,38 I also
examined the real property records to see the value and the subsequent
disposition of the home by the heirs and beneficiaries. Not surprisingly,
the results showed that the testate estates had homes of significantly
greater value that were likely to be retained or sold at or near the fair
market value. The intestate estates had homes of far less value and were
too frequently lost to tax sales or foreclosure or, if sold, were sold for
well below the fair market value. This evidence suggests that we should
look at possible legal and policy changes to help interrupt the
downward wealth cycle for the families of poorer decedents by focusing
on ways to protect real property assets.
II.

METHODOLOGY

I began this study by collecting the death certificates, probate
petitions, and wills and codicils of every person whose estate was
probated in the year 2013 in Alachua County, Florida. Although 1,799
people died in the county in that year,39 only 408 estates were probated,
for a roughly 23% probate rate.40 For the other 1,391 people, we can
never know exactly how much property they had or what happened to
it. Hopefully, most of it passed through non-probate mechanisms, such
38

See Wright & Sterner, supra note 28, at 358-70.
Leading Causes of Death — 2013, FLA. DEP’T HEALTH, http://www.
flhealthcharts.com/ChartsReports/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=ChartsProfiles.LeadingCauses
OfDeathProfile (last visited Feb. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YN4R-X9QY].
40 These were all cases filed for probate in Alachua County during 2013. Of course,
many of the cases filed for probate were of decedents who died in 2012 or even earlier.
But the number of cases filed each year and the number of deaths are consistent enough
to conclude that on average only about 25% of decedents leave wealth that requires
probate.
39
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as revocable trusts, joint tenancies, and transfer-on-death (“TOD”) or
payable-on-death (“POD”) designations to the intended beneficiaries.
Half of the decedents likely owned only tangible personal property that
would have been distributed to next of kin by family and no probate
process would have been necessary.41 Some of those people will have
been out-of-state residents and their estates will have been probated in
their county of domicile. But 408 people were domiciled in Alachua
County at death and they owned some form of property titled solely in
their own name that required court-supervised probate to facilitate its
transfer to the appropriate taker. For many, this was a piece of real
estate, most often the family home. For others, it was simply a bank
account, a securities account without a beneficiary designation, and, in
some cases, wrongful death proceeds. Although a dollar amount is
provided by the personal representative for most estates being probated,
that number was often significantly undervalued, as property that
passes through a non-probate will substitute, and most tangible
personal property, need not be probated at all. Nevertheless, there were
some significant differences between the assets and demographics of the
intestate decedents and the testate decedents.
I have already reported on the dramatic wealth gap between the
testate and intestate decedents.42 In my earlier study of 115 intestate
decedents and 293 testate decedents, I found the following distinctions:
• The median age of intestate decedents was sixty-five and the
median age of testate decedents was eighty-four.
• The median size estate of intestate decedents was $17,400 and
the median size of testate decedents was $67,000.43
• No intestate estate was over $1 million, but at least seven
testate estates were worth more than $1 million.

41 See Wealth Distribution in the United States in 2016, supra note 9 (showing that
the bottom 50% of the population owned 0% of wealth).
42 See Danaya C. Wright, Disrupting the Wealth Gap Cycles: An Empirical Study of
Testacy and Wealth, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 295, 298 (2019) [hereinafter Disrupting]; Danaya
C. Wright, The Demographics of Intergenerational Transmission of Wealth: An Empirical
Study of Testacy and Intestacy on Family Property, 88 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 5-6) (on file with author) [hereinafter Demographics].
43 This number is particularly squishy, as wealth passing through non-probate will
substitutes do not need to be listed in probate proceedings, and in many cases the value
of the homestead does not require disclosure as Florida authorizes homestead
protections for the descent of homes of unlimited value. See Wright, Disrupting, supra
note 42, at 305-08.
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• Ten percent of intestate estates were valued at less than $500;
no testate estate was valued that low.
• In a county in which whites comprise only 61% of the
population, 93% of testate decedents were white and 60% of
the intestate decedents were white.
• In a county in which Blacks comprise 20% of the population,
4% of the testate decedents were Black and 32% of the
intestate decedents were Black.
• The mean wealth of white testate decedents was $191,043 and
the mean wealth of Black testate decedents was $76,460.
• The mean wealth of white intestate decedents was $59,954
and the mean wealth of Black intestate decedents was
$32,536.
• Testate decedents were 57% female and 43% male; intestate
decedents were 42% female and 58% male.
• The mean wealth of testate male decedents was $279,874 and
the mean wealth of testate female decedents was $112,421.
• The mean wealth of intestate male decedents was $55,813 and
the mean wealth of intestate female decedents was $61,393.
• Married white testate men had more overall wealth, average
wealth, and median wealth than any other category of
decedents, married, single, divorced, or never married.
These statistics offer stark evidence that race, sex, marital status, and
age correlate with higher and lower levels of wealth, and for somewhat
obvious reasons. White men clearly have more wealth overall, on
average, than white women or Black men or women.44 Men have more
wealth overall than women, notwithstanding that testate women
comprised the largest single group of decedents in the data set.45
There were far more nuances to the data than I have summarized
here.46 The goal in my earlier work has been to identify as much
information as I can about the identity and behavior of testate decedents
and the identity and behavior of intestate decedents to identify the
44

See id. at 316-20.
Id. at 316.
46 This data is more fully explored in Wright, Demographics, supra note 42
(manuscript at 40-47).
45
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population most in need of estate-planning services. Many of the
intestate decedents died unexpectedly, through accidents or sudden
medical emergencies. Three of my intestate decedents were under the
age of ten, and ten intestate decedents were under the age of thirty-five.
No testate decedents were under the age of thirty-five. Half of the testate
decedents were over the age of eighty-five while only 16% of the
intestate decedents were over the age of eighty-five. Collectively, the set
of testate decedents were quite elderly (over age seventy-five), white,
and more often female. The intestate decedents were much younger,
with the majority in the forty-five to sixty-five age range, and more often
male. And although a majority were white, there was a far greater
percentage of Black decedents than are represented in the population as
a whole. The intestate decedents also held far less wealth than the testate
decedents, which is compounded by the likelihood that the testate
decedents had significantly more unreported wealth passing through
will substitutes than the intestate decedents.47
But why do these differences matter? Intestacy is the succession plan
that we have assumed for centuries reflects the most likely intent of a
majority of people. Under most intestacy rules, the surviving spouse is
entitled to at least half and often the entirety of the decedent’s estate.48
What is left passes equally to the children and grandchildren.49 If there
is no surviving spouse or descendants, the estate passes to siblings,
aunts and uncles, cousins, and then eventually to the state if there are
no kin within the required degree of relationship.50 And not
surprisingly, I found that a majority of the testate decedents left their
property (a) to their surviving spouse if he or she survived and, if not,
then to the children equally or (b) to the children equally.51 So we
cannot assume that intestate dispositions are inherently undesirable if
most testate decedents are following the same patterns.52
47 As discussed more fully below, many people will have wealth that passes through
a non-probate will substitute, like a joint tenancy, a trust, life insurance, or an account
with a beneficiary designation. This wealth need not be disclosed and, in general, the
more wealthy decedents are likely to have had more undisclosed wealth pass through
these mechanisms than the less wealthy decedents. See discussion infra Table 6.
48 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (amended 2010). Although many states have not
adopted the Uniform Probate Code, it is representative of the vast majority of intestacy
provisions in the different states, and I cite to it here rather than give a handful of
random state statutes.
49 Id. § 2-103.
50 Id.; id. § 2-105.
51 See Wright & Sterner, supra note 28, at 361-62.
52 This is not to say that the intestate priorities represent probable intent beyond
the spouse and descendants. See Mary Louise Fellows & E. Gary Spitko, How Should
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Yet simply having the real property pass through court-supervised
probate is certainly a burden if probate takes time and resources away
from the heirs who cannot afford to hire a lawyer and the delay means
the real property cannot be listed and sold, or that mortgage payments
are not being made and the house enters foreclosure. Unfortunately for
many heirs, the reason for having to go through court-supervised
probate is because the decedent owned real property that was not held
in a joint tenancy, a trust, or with a TOD designation that would allow
it to pass outside probate to successors.53 In my study, 96% of the
intestate decedents whose homes were later sold by the heirs held real
property that had to be probated, compared to 71% of the testate
decedents whose homes were later sold and for which probate was
necessary because of the presence of real property in the estate.54 Had
the decedents done some basic estate planning to permit their homes to
pass smoothly to successors, roughly 50% of the intestate decedents
could have avoided probate altogether, as the real property was the only
asset being probated. On the other hand, only 9% of testate decedents
listed only real property in their petitions as the cause for initiating
probate.55 The other 91% of the testate decedents had other assets that
also required probate. Thus, providing a simple, non-probate
mechanism to manage transfers of the decedents’ homes to heirs could
have a tremendous and disproportionate benefit for intestate and lower
wealth individuals.
Moreover, just because testate decedents also leave their property in
roughly equal shares to their children does not mean that the intestate
rules cannot be improved upon. In particular, the problem of
fractionation when there are multiple heirs means that many properties
Non-Probate Transfers Matter in Intestacy? , 53 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2207, 2216 (2020).
When decedents do not have descendants they leave their property in wildly different
ways. See, e.g., Russell N. James III, The Emerging Potential of Longitudinal Empirical
Research in Estate Planning: Examples from Charitable Bequests, 53 UC DAVIS L. REV.
2397, 2415 (2020) (documenting “that having children is associated with a significant
decrease in the probability of having a charitable estate plan”).
53 A little over half of all states have a mechanism to allow for a beneficiary
designation on real property, either through the Uniform Real Property Transfer on
Death Act, their own TOD deed statutes, or through the use of enhanced life estates.
See Wright, Beneficiary Deeds, supra note 33 (manuscript at 2-3).
54 See discussion infra Table 6.
55 These are the numbers only for the testate and intestate decedents who owned
real property before death and which property was later sold by the heirs. More than
half of the testate real property and almost half of the intestate real property was either
retained by successors or foreclosed upon, and many of those did not require probate if
the successor was the surviving spouse and the home was held in joint tenancy or
tenancy by the entirety. See infra Table 6.
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may have to be sold and the proceeds split to pay legacies for all the
children.56 When that happens, heirs who are less financially stable may
be forced to sell immediately even though the market might not be
right.57 Less financially stable heirs are also less likely to be able to
modernize the property in anticipation of a higher sales price than heirs
who are more financially stable. Some heirs may insist on selling the
property immediately, while others might want to rent the property and
receive an income stream. But renting requires maintenance and
supervision, which many heirs might not be able to provide, especially
if they live afar. Studies show that sales as a result of forced partition
yield well-below fair market value compared to homes sold voluntarily
by the homeowner.58 So if we assume that the heirs of the less-wealthy
intestate decedents are likely to be less financially stable than the heirs
of the wealthier testate decedents, the former are less likely to be able
to leverage their inheritances to produce more wealth or to even retain
what their parents may have worked so hard to acquire. Furthermore,
when we examine the real property owned by the intestate decedents,
we not surprisingly find that it was generally worth less, was located in
less desirable neighborhoods, and was often sold at significantly below
the fair market value.59
By examining the real property records of the testate and intestate
decedents we can see vividly how the wealth cycle works for the wealthy
and fails for the generally poorer intestate decedents. Although there
were well-to-do intestate decedents and poor testate decedents, a close
examination of their real property holdings and subsequent disposition
tells a very enlightening story about the wealth gap and cycles of
poverty.

56 The fractionation problems are legion. When real property is fractionated
through intestacy, many families are unable to afford the expense to retitle the property
and, over time, title issues compound. As a result, the Uniform Law Commission has
promulgated the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act to deal with this problem. As
of February 1, 2020, it has been adopted in fifteen states and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Partition of Heirs Property Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/
committees/community-home?CommunityKey=50724584-e808-4255-bc5d-8ea4e588
371d [https://perma.cc/DA36-3FVK]; see also Joan Flocks et al., The Disproportionate
Impact of Heirs’ Property in Florida’s Low-Income Communities of Color, 92 FLA. B.J. 57,
57-58 (2018); Spivack, supra note 4, at 194-96.
57 See Mitchell et al., supra note 34, at 608-09.
58 Id.
59 See infra Table 4.
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III. THE REAL PROPERTY DATA
In this initial study, I examined the estate records of all 115 intestate
decedents and 110 testate decedents to determine how many of them
owned real property at death or shortly before death and what became
of the homes after the homeowner died. Although not all of the
decedents had their homes pass through probate because many held
them in joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, or in a trust, they had
owned them at death and their interests passed to successors. And a
sizable number of homes were retained by surviving spouses and/or
heirs, but by no means a majority.60 Even when a married couple owned
a home, the survivor often sold it when the first spouse died. Thus, even
if homes were held jointly so that the home itself did not have to pass
through the probate process, many of these homes were disposed of
shortly after the decedent’s death and could be located through a
property records search.61
When I found that a decedent had been on the title of real property,
I examined the assessed value and the sales history from the point the
decedent acquired the property until the present. I noted where the title
was held in the name of the “heirs of XY,” which indicated that the heirs
had not taken the steps to retitle the property in their own names, so it
essentially remained in the name of the decedent’s estate. I noted those
instances where the heirs had taken the trouble to transfer the title to
their own names and then, in some instances, had quit claimed various
shares to other heirs in an attempt to re-aggregate the property title in
the name of one heir. I noted where the home had been held by the
decedent and a spouse as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety, and
the spouse continued to reside in the home. In one instance, the
decedent had disposed of the property herself prior to death by
transferring it to the persons who were also named as her will
beneficiaries. But in the slight majority of situations, I found that the
beneficiaries — either surviving spouse, children, parents, or even an

60

See infra Tables 2-3.
Property records are available on the Alachua County Property Appraiser’s
Website. ALACHUA CTY. PROP. APPRAISER, https://www.acpafl.org/ (last visited Mar. 21,
2020) [https://perma.cc/LLE6-LR3B]. Using addresses and names one can usually find
the appropriate Tax ID Number. With that information, one can find recent sales data,
and also navigate to the Clerk of the Court’s records for recorded mortgages and to the
Tax Collector’s website for tax delinquencies. County Clerk Web Access, ALACHUA
COUNTY, http://isol.alachuaclerk.org/RealEstate/SearchEntry.aspx (last visited Mar. 21,
2020) [https://perma.cc/PU2L-MHCB]; Tax Collector, ALACHUA COUNTY,
https://www.alachuacollector.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6WVLC2AU].
61
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ex-wife — had sold the real property within a few years of the testator’s
death. I noted not only the sales price received from these sales, but also
subsequent sales as my study spanned a period of volatile real property
values and the home foreclosure crisis. And in a startling number of
cases, banks and mortgage companies had been involved in subsequent
transactions, some of which appeared to be foreclosures of homes that
were under water, were unable to be sold by the beneficiaries and were
simply released to the bank. In one case, a voluntary transfer was made
to the bank by the surviving spouse to avoid foreclosure. In others, the
bank forced a sale but ended up acquiring the property at significantly
less than its fair market value.
In the cases of the foreclosures and tax sales, I also examined the
public records of the tax assessor to determine how long there had been
defaults on payment of taxes, and the county clerk’s website to examine
all mortgages filed against the properties. From these records I could
usually surmise whether the home was foreclosed upon because it was
underwater and could not be sold by the beneficiaries, or it was simply
abandoned by the heirs and the bank sold it to pay what was, in some
instances, a very small amount left on the mortgage. In these later
instances, the heirs would have lost all equity in the home. A lengthy
period of non-payment of property taxes could be attributed to financial
woes or a lengthy period of incapacity on the part of the decedent, or
neglect or financial instability on the part of the heirs after the
decedent’s death.
For all properties, I examined the popular real estate website Zillow
to obtain a fair market value.62 Because these were 2019 values, they
were likely to overstate the value of a home that might have been sold
in 2013 or 2014, when real estate prices were somewhat more
depressed. Thus, to obtain a more accurate value, I determined a fair
market value by averaging the current value provided on Zillow, with
the 2018 Total Just Value provided by the property assessor’s website.
In all but one instance, the Zillow value was higher than the Total Just
Value, and in most cases the latter value was roughly 80% of the Zillow
value. By averaging the two numbers I obtained a value that seemed to
be within range of the sales prices for many of the homes.
During the period of my study, however, the median sales prices of
homes in Alachua County increased by more than 25% between 2013
and 2018, although most of that increase was in the years 2017 and
2018 as the effects of the recession finally began to lift. To better reflect
62 ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
M89S-3LBC].
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the economic circumstances under which most heirs were making
decisions about selling these homes, I adjusted the fair market value,
obtained by averaging the Zillow value with the Total Just Value, by
multiplying that value by a percentage that reflected the increase in
median home values in the county identified by Zillow. Table 1 below
shows the Zillow Home Value Index and the Median Sales Price. I
adjusted my fair market values for each home sold by the inflation
adjustment percentage for the year sold. For instance, if a home was
sold in 2013 and my average fair market value was $200,000, I
multiplied that value by 0.71 to obtain an adjusted fair market value at
the time of sale of $142,000. On the other hand, if the home was not
sold until 2017, and its average fair market value was $200,000, I
multiplied that value by 0.92 to obtain an adjusted fair market value at
the time of sale of $184,000.
Table 1. Inflation Adjustment Percentages
Date

January, 2012
January, 2013
January, 2014
January, 2015
January, 2016
January, 2017
January, 2018

Zillow Home
Value Index63
$139,000
$134,000
$144,000
$150,000
$157,000
$166,000
$180,000

Median Sales
Price64
$123,000
$129,000
$120,000
$134,000
$146,000
$169,000
$171,000

Inflation
Adjustment
Percentage65
72%
75%
70%
78%
85%
99%
100%

Moreover, it is very difficult to find a true fair market value for all of
these homes as some were located in neighborhoods that rebounded

63 Zillow Home Value Index for Alachua County, Florida. Alachua County Home
Prices & Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/alachua-county-fl/home-values/ (last
visited Jan. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/URZ4-4BUU]. The Zillow Home Value Index is
an estimate valuation for a given geographic area.
64 Id. In all years of my study except 2017, the median sales price was lower than
the home value index, suggesting that lower end homes were selling better in Alachua
County during those years than were predicted or than higher value homes.
65 If a home was sold in 2014, for instance, I multiplied the fair market value of the
home by 0.70 to determine how much below or above the fair market value the home
was sold for.
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from the recession more quickly than other neighborhoods.66 Homes
with special appeal or in preferred neighborhoods rebounded more
quickly, but the real estate market in Alachua County has nearly
reached its 2007 high. Thus, over time, some of the differences will have
gradually evened out and, although none of these real estate values are
perfect, they are reasonably close for a market that is notoriously
uneven and difficult to gauge. And despite the tentative nature of the
data, the results show pretty astounding differences between the testate
and the intestate real properties that were sold.
A. Testate and Intestate Real Property Records
I examined the estates and property records of 110 testate decedents,
of which twenty-nine held no apparent real property, forty-two held
property that was later sold by surviving spouses and heirs, nineteen
had held property that was retained by the spouse and continued to be
utilized, thirteen had held property that was retained by the heirs, five
held property that was transferred to a bank or mortgage company for
value, and two had homes that were currently for sale.
Table 2. Testate Estates with Real Property
Testate Estates
No Real Property
Real Property
Disposition

Number

Percent of Total
29
81

26
74
Percent of Total Owning
Real Property

Number

Sold

42

52

Retained by Spouse

19

23

Retained by Heirs
Foreclosure
For Sale

13
5
2

16
6
2

66 See Anthony Clark, Alachua County Zombie Subdivisions Slowly Coming Back to
Life, GAINESVILLE SUN (Mar. 12, 2016, 4:10 PM), https://www.gainesville.com/
article/LK/20160312/news/604145280/GS/ [https://perma.cc/FC2N-MQ7L]; see also
Fan Zhang, An Economic Impact Study of Historic Districts in Gainesville, Florida
(2016) (unpublished MURP thesis, University of Florida) (on file with George A.
Smathers Libraries, University of Florida), https://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0050755/00001
[https://perma.cc/459L-XS2M] (finding that homes in historic districts in Gainesville
retained their value better during the recession and rebounded more quickly than
similar homes outside historic districts).
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Because of the importance of these real property assets for successors,
I focused especially on subsequent sales or losses of the homes through
foreclosure, because homes still retained by survivors were clearly being
utilized. Slightly over half of the testate homes (forty-two of eighty-one)
were sold at some point after the death of the decedent, some as quickly
as the same year of death, and one as late as fourteen years later.67 Most,
however, were sold within five years of death, with the average time
between death of the decedent and sale of the home being 3.3 years.68
The median value of the testate home sales was $142,749 with the
lowest being $5,800 and the highest being $745,254.69 This put them
very close to the median home value for 2014, which is when many of
these homes were sold. Only twelve homes (29%) were valued below
$100,000.
The intestate properties were quite different, however. Of the 115
intestate decedents whose estates were probated, forty-eight had no
apparent real property. Of the remaining sixty-seven, twenty-nine held
real property that was sold, eleven held property retained by the spouse,
seventeen held property retained by the heirs, and ten had homes that
were lost to tax sale and foreclosure.
Table 3. Intestate Estates with Real Property
Intestate Estates

Number

Percent of Total

No Real Property

48

42

Real Property

67
2970

59
Percent of Total Owning
l
43

Retained by Spouse

11

16

Retained by Heirs

17

25

Foreclosure/Tax Sale

10

15

Disposition
Sold

Number

67 It is likely that the probate was necessary because the heirs were finally deciding
to sell the home and needed to clear the title. Presumably they were living in the home
for the preceding fourteen years, or renting it and receiving an income stream.
68 See infra Table 5.
69 The average adjusted fair market value of the testate homes was $194,924, which
showed significant skewing toward the higher end.
70 Of the twenty-nine intestate decedents who owned real property, I omitted three
of them from my calculations because one owned a vacant lot, one owned commercial
real estate, and one owned a duplex that was sold and torn down to build apartments,
so the fair market value could not be easily determined.
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And most notable was the value of these homes. They ranged in value
from $3,500 (vacant lot) at the lowest to $15,450 for the lowest value
home to $225,776 at the highest, with the median home value being
$74,508. Sixteen of these homes (62%) were valued at under $100,000.
The median home value of the intestate decedents was only 52% of the
value of the median home value of the testate decedents. Of course, this
is not particularly surprising, as people with more wealth are likely to
have homes with higher values and are more likely to execute a will or
engage in more robust estate planning than those with lower value
property. But this is precisely where we should be concerned. To the
extent lower- and working-class decedents were able to acquire real
property, it is particularly important that that property not be lost as it
passes from generation to generation where the importance of
inheritances to building wealth is so crucial.
When we think about the role of the family home in family stability,
building wealth, and providing a firm step into the middle class, we
should look critically at what happens to it throughout the succession
process. From the point the decedent homeowner becomes
incapacitated and perhaps has to move to hospice or a nursing home,
through the court-supervised probate process, getting the home retitled
in the name of the heirs, and then their decision to sell or retain it, the
home goes through a very vulnerable period. If the home is retained by
a surviving spouse or descendants, or it is sold quickly for substantial
value and the heirs receive a decent inheritance, we can feel that the
process is working. But if the home is lost to foreclosure or tax sale
because of the homeowner’s lengthy period of incapacity, it is allowed
to deteriorate and thus is sold for well below fair market value, or it is
sold quickly to unload it by heirs who need to make a credit card
payment, then there is a problem — a problem that is only exacerbated
by the delays and costs of probate administration. And although I
cannot get into the financial circumstances of every decedent and his or
her heirs and devisees to understand the motives and pressures facing
the survivors, I can analyze objectively what happened to the homes of
these eighty-one testate and sixty-seven intestate decedents.71
Of the 148 homes owned by decedents, 60 (32 testate and 28 intestate
(40% of total)) were still owned by the children, spouses, or siblings in
71 Ultimately, out of 225 probated estates, 148 owned real property (81 testate
decedents and 67 intestate decedents). See supra Tables 2-3. In all but two instances,
the real property was a home. The other two were commercial properties that were
difficult to value. A small number of decedents also owned additional real property,
including beach condos, neighboring lots, and agricultural lands. I did not generally
analyze what happened to these other real property assets.
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2019, at least six years after probate and for some decedents as long as
a decade after their death. Forty percent of these homes, therefore,
continued to be utilized by heirs and beneficiaries and inured to their
benefit, including providing homes or an income stream and ultimately
preserving the decedent’s hard-earned equity. But sixty-eight homes
(forty-two testate and twenty-six intestate (46% of total)) were sold and
fifteen (five testate and ten intestate (10% of total)) were lost through
foreclosure or tax sale, which were moments when wealth could be
easily lost or leveraged depending on the unique characteristics of the
property.
B. Sales by Survivors
Of the forty-two testate homes and twenty-six intestate homes that
were sold by the heirs or beneficiaries after the death of the homeowner,
the sales prices tell a sobering story.
Table 4. Sales Prices as Compared to Fair Market Value (FMV)
Sale Percent

Testate

25% FMV or
less72
25%<FMV<50%
50%<FMV<75%
75%<FMV<100%
>100%

1

Percent of
Whole
2%

1
3
12
25

2%
7%
29%
60%

1

Percent of
Whole
4%

3
6
6
11

11%
22%
22%
41%

Intestate

Even when the homes were not lost to tax sale or foreclosure, the
homes of intestate decedents were nearly four times more likely to be
sold at less than 50% of fair market value than the homes of the testate
decedents and three times more likely to be sold at below 75% of fair
market value. For instance, only one testate home but four intestate
homes were sold at below 30% of fair market value. Three of the four
intestate homes were valued below $75,000, as was the one testate
home, showing that lower value homes are more susceptible to a
“succession discount.” This succession discount is apparent when these
homes on the low side of the market are at risk for being sold for
significantly below the adjusted fair market value (one for 12% and one

72 This represents the difference between the sales price and the adjusted fair market
value at the time of sale for the twenty-six intestate homes and forty-two testate homes.

2626

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 53:2603

for 20%!); they also consequently yielded relatively small inheritances
for the heirs/beneficiaries.
On the other end of the economic spectrum, 89% of testate homes but
only 63% of intestate homes were sold for 75% or higher of fair market
value. Sliced a different way, only 44% of the intestate homes but 79%
of testate homes were sold for 90% or higher of fair market value. The
homes that sold for close to fair market value were mostly in the highervalue range, with the average home value of these higher-grossing
testate homes being $215,577 and the average value of the intestate
homes being $84,601.73
If we consider that lower home values and younger intestate heirs are
a risky combination in which the heirs are likely to be less able to
improve homes in order sell them at a fair price, or are in a hurry to sell
because they are less financially secure, it is evident that the intestate
heirs are less well-positioned to take advantage of their inheritances
than their testate counterparts. The fact that over one-third of intestate
homes but only 11% of testate are being sold for well below fair market
value, and that the intestate homes are worth significantly less, suggests
that the inheritances that these heirs and beneficiaries are likely to
receive are going to be quite different. And that too is borne out by the
data. I broke down each sale for each home by the number of heirs or
devisees and found that the median real property inheritance from a
testate decedent was $120,000 with $1,409 being the lowest and
$527,500 being the highest. On the other hand, the median real
property inheritance from an intestate decedent was $30,000, with $300
being the lowest and $224,900 being the highest. Once again, we are
looking at testate beneficiaries receiving roughly four times as much
wealth as intestate beneficiaries from the inheritances of real property.
Certainly, the higher-end intestate estates generated significant wealth
for the beneficiaries, but only four (14%) estates generated inheritances
of over $100,000 for beneficiaries. On the flip side, twenty-six (62%) of
the forty-two testate estates generated inheritances of over $100,000 per
beneficiary. Add that to the fact that testate decedents are nearly twenty
years older than intestate decedents, and it is a reasonable conclusion
that the testate heirs are older and better situated financially to leverage
their newly acquired wealth than their intestate counterparts.
Thus, in examining the sales data of the combined sixty-eight homes
that were sold after the decedent’s death, we see some pretty stark
73 The median value of the intestate homes sold at 90% or more of fair market value
was $69,333 (about $5,000 lower than the median of all intestate homes being sold)
and the median value of the testate homes sold at 90% or more of fair market value was
$175,075 (about $335,000 higher than median of all testate homes being sold).
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differences. The homes of intestate decedents were overall of lower
value than those of testate decedents, they were more likely to be sold
at below fair market value than those of testate decedents, and the
intestate heirs took significantly smaller inheritances than their testate
counterparts. There was a small difference in the average length of time
between death and sale of testate and intestate homes, with testate being
slightly longer at 3.3 years and intestate sales occurring on average 2.6
years after death. That small difference, however, could indicate greater
ability of the testate heirs to hold onto the homes and fix them up prior
to sale, or hold out for a higher offer than the intestate heirs. The
difference is too small, however, to indicate significance although it is
supportive of the larger trend seen here.
Table 5. Date of Home Sales
Year Sold
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total
Average Time
Between Death and
Sale

Testate
3
8
10
5
7
4
4
1
42
3.3 years

Intestate
0
11
4
5
4
1
1
0
26
2.6 years

The homes of the testate decedents also tended to be in
neighborhoods with higher average home values while the homes of the
intestate decedents were in neighborhoods with lower home values, or
were located in rural areas of the county with less sales appeal. Factors
such as housing segregation, zoning, and government investments in
infrastructure all contribute to the complexity of housing values.74 As
local governments protect through zoning and real covenants the
74 See Mitchell, supra note 3, at 852 (discussing the myriad ways in which zoning,
housing segregation, and other factors affect home values); see also Sheila R. Foster, The
Limits of Mobility and the Persistence of Urban Inequality, 127 YALE L.J.F. 480, 482-87
(2017).
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properties of certain owners and do not protect the property values of
others, neighborhoods rise and fall with the decisions of city counselors
who are not thinking about how their decisions might affect the life
prospects of generations to come.
Of course, as this data show, there are correlations between wealth
and rates of testacy and intestacy, but they do not show causation. And
I certainly do not want to imply that dying testate causes decedents and
heirs to have greater wealth or to be able to protect their wealth better
than dying intestate. But the data suggest that dying intestate correlates
with lower value homes and overall less wealth, which can be lost more
easily when the property must go through the court-supervised probate
process. In diving more deeply into the data on these sixty-eight homes
that were sold, we also see that twenty-five out of twenty-six (96%) of
the intestate probate petitions listed the real property as an asset of the
estate requiring probate.75 Only twenty-eight out of forty-two of the
testate petitions (67%) probated the homes that I examined. This means
that fully one-third of the testate decedents had titled their real property
so that it passed directly to beneficiaries, most often through a joint
tenancy or tenancy by the entirety. Some held the property in trust, and
then the successor trustee subsequently sold the home after the trust
settlor’s death. Only one intestate decedent held her home as a joint
tenant so that it did not need to pass through the probate process to
have it titled in the names of the heirs.76
Moreover, twelve — or just under half of the estates of the intestate
decedents where homes were sold — held no additional property
besides the homestead requiring probate. This meant that these estates
had to go through the delay and administrative cost of probate simply
for the homes owned by these decedents. Fourteen of the twenty-seven
intestate estates included additional non-homestead property, but much
of it was of fairly low value. Four indicated that the additional nonhomestead property was worth less than $1,000, and four others
indicated that the additional non-homestead property was worth less
than $10,000. Most of this property could have been distributed
without probate, but was likely included because probate of the real
75

See infra Table 6.
See infra Table 6. The fact that most intestate decedents had to probate the real
estate — while only two-thirds of the testate decedents did — supports the conclusion
that the median wealth of the testate decedents identified in the probate petitions
significantly undervalues their total estates. At a bare minimum, for those decedents
whose homes passed through a non-probate will substitute, the value of those homes
are not reflected in the overall wealth figures I was able to capture from the probate
records explored in earlier scholarship.
76
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property was going forward anyway and creditors could be barred from
claims on all probated property after conclusion of administration. Only
six intestate decedents had additional non-homestead probated
property worth $20,000 or more.
The testate estates tell a very different story again. Although only
twenty-eight of the forty-two testate estates (67%) included the homes
in the probate petition, at least thirty-three of the forty-two (79%) had
non-homestead property to be probated in addition to the home.
Moreover, the total wealth of the testate non-real property was
$3,873,000 as against the total claimed value of the homestead property
at $2,244,300. Thus, if we combine the wealth of the testate decedents,
we see that they probated a combined declared wealth of $6,366,117, of
which only 39% consisted of the real property homesteads. The
remaining 61% of the testate wealth was in intangible and tangible
personal property and some non-residential real property. Intestate
decedents, on the other hand, probated a combined declared total
wealth of $2,031,072 of which 71% consisted of the homestead real
property and only 29% of additional intangible and tangible personal
property. The table below illustrates the complexity of the two groups
of probated estates for a fuller picture of the wealth gap between testate
and intestate decedents.
Table 6. Real and Personal Property Assets Being Probated
Number of Estates that Probated the
Real Property
Total Claimed Value of Real
Property in Probate Petition
Adjusted FMV of Same Real
Property
Total Additional Non-homestead
Property
Number of Estates with Additional
Non-homestead Property
Average Non-homestead Property
per Estate

Testate
28/42 (67%)

Intestate
25/26 (96%)

$2,493,405

$1,448,340

$2,771,191

$1,491,751

$3,872,712

$582,732

32/42 (76%)

14/26 (54%)

$121,022

$41,623

The numbers in the last row of Table 6 supra are just one more piece
in the rapidly emerging picture of the wealth gap cycle between the
testate and intestate decedents. While both groups probated a
significant amount of real property, the intestate decedents had far less
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additional property requiring probate than the testate decedents. So
when we compound the effects of the lower value homes, the likelihood
that they will be sold for lower than fair market value, the less additional
property in these estates, and the slightly larger number of heirs who
will divide the inheritances, we see that intestate heirs receive
inheritances about one-fourth, on average, of what their testate
counterparts receive. And since all but one intestate estate had to
probate the real property, there was likely to be a greater delay and some
cost associated with probate of the real property that did not affect the
one-third of testate estates in which the real property passed
automatically at death through a non-probate will substitute.
C. Foreclosures and Tax Sales
Perhaps the most shocking results I found were the striking number
of foreclosures and forfeitures in the records and again, not surprisingly,
these were heavily concentrated in the intestate estates. These
foreclosures and tax sales resulted in the home being taken over by the
bank or mortgage company, and whatever equity the decedent might
have had in the home was lost to the heirs entirely. But as with the home
sales, not all foreclosures were the same.77 There appeared to be two
basic types of foreclosures. The first occurred when the decedent had
bought the house relatively recently, say between 2000 and 2007, when
home prices were relatively high, and when they died they had not had
time to pay off a significant portion of the mortgage.78 Some of these
homes were bought in 2006 and 2007 and were clearly under water as
a result of the rapid decline in home values brought on by the 2008
recession. These homes were like so many that fed the mortgage
foreclosure crisis that heirs simply gave the homes back to the bank
rather than try to hold onto them and continue to pay the high
mortgages until their value rebounded or sell them at a loss. Some
others involved homes that were purchased perhaps many years earlier,
but had been refinanced in 2006 or 2007 or for which home equity loans
had been obtained. Both of these scenarios involved homes with little
or no equity and foreclosure was probably easier for the successors than
managing the property or trying to sell it.
The other type of foreclosure is more problematic, however. These
were situations in which it appeared the decedent had significant equity
77

See Mitchell et al., supra note 34, at 601-09.
Others were bought earlier but the decedent had taken out home equity loans or
reverse mortgages so that the amount of equity the decedent had in the home was quite
small.
78
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in the home but had not completely paid off the mortgage. These
foreclosures occurred most likely because the decedent suffered a
lengthy period of incapacity and no one paid the mortgages or property
taxes for a year or two. These homes tended to be of lower value, but
the decedent still had significant equity in them and they were
auctioned for the property taxes or the remainder of the mortgage which
tended to be quite low. For these homes, the entire value was lost to the
heirs because the decedent had owed very little or may have owned the
home outright but simply failed to pay property taxes. And consistent
with the sales data, the testate foreclosures tended to be of the first type
and the intestate foreclosures tended to be of the second type.
Sadly, 15% (ten of sixty-seven properties) of the intestate homes were
lost through tax sales and foreclosures, while only 6% (five of eightytwo properties) of the testate homes were lost. Despite the numbers,
however, the types of foreclosure were quite different. By examining the
bank’s bid, the date and amount of the recorded mortgages, the value of
the property, and the decedent’s date of acquisition, we can begin to
piece together the unique circumstances of each foreclosure. And even
though the numbers are quite small, only fifteen homes in all, there are
patterns that are consistent with the other findings of this study, that
the real property of intestate decedents is more vulnerable to dissipation
at the point of intergenerational transfer than the real property of testate
decedents.
In five and possibly six of the ten homes owned by intestate decedents
(F, G, I, L, N & possibly H), there appeared to be only low or modest
amounts due on mortgages, and the banks acquired the homes on bids
of roughly half the fair market value or quite less.79 This indicated that
the heirs lost anywhere from 40-100% of the equity that these decedents
had built up in these homes. Only one in five of the testate foreclosures
(B) seemed to indicate a similar substantial loss in equity, although the
heirs in that case were real estate developers and seemed to be more
79 F involved a home valued at over $250,000 with a mortgage of $130,000. When
foreclosed upon in 2014 after the unexpected death of the decedent, the bank bid a mere
$100 and resold it shortly thereafter for $65,000. The home was quickly renovated and
sold two years later for $285,000. G was worth roughly $75,000 but was foreclosed on
in 2011 based on $21,000 left on the mortgage. It was sold by the bank for $26,000 the
same year as the foreclosure, resulting in loss of significant assets to the three children.
In L, the amount owed on the mortgage, based on the bank’s bid, was roughly half the
equity in the home ($52,500 on a home valued at $103,000) and in I the amount owed
was a little more than half ($41,000 on a home valued at $73,900). And in one
indeterminate intestate foreclosure (H), the mortgage was higher than the home was
worth with $224,000 in mortgages on a home valued at only $180,000, but the bank’s
bid indicates that the decedent may have paid off half the mortgage before death.
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knowledgeable and perhaps strategic in their decision to allow a
foreclosure.80 And it is notable that the only tax sale (N) involved a
home that appeared to be completely paid off, but after the decedent’s
death the property taxes went unpaid in part because one of the
decedent’s children was in prison.81 Those heirs lost all the decedent’s
equity in that home.
The underwater foreclosures fell differently. Four of the five testate
foreclosures (A, C, D, E) appeared to be for homes that were purchased
recently or had extensive outstanding mortgages, only one of which
appears to have involved any loss of equity.82 Four intestate foreclosures
(J, K, M, O),83 and possibly five (H), also involved high mortgages or
80 This home, B, had a fair market value of $186,000, and the bank bid was only
$63,000. It was then purchased from the bank by a real estate broker in 2017 for
$156,000 and sold by her two years later for $275,000. By walking away from this home,
each of the three sons received about $25,000 in tangible and intangible personal
property from their father’s estate at the time of probate, but gave up an additional
$200,000 in the lost opportunity to fix up and resell their parents’ homestead.
Curiously, one of the three sons appears to have been a real estate broker in the area, so
it is likely that they understood what was going on with the foreclosure.
81 The one tax sale involved a home owned by the decedent at her death in 2008.
She had two children, a son and daughter, but the son was in prison at the time of her
death. Following her death, her property taxes fell delinquent from 2009 to 2013 when
the home was sold at tax sale for less than $9,000. Her home had an assessed value of
$55,000 and a fair market value of $88,500 and she had paid off her mortgage a decade
earlier in 1998. The entire value of this home appears to have been lost to the heirs.
82 Two testate foreclosures were bid upon by the bank for an amount that roughly
equaled the fair market value (D and E). One had been acquired in 2007, and the other
had been heavily mortgaged with a long line of home equity loans. And both were later
sold by the bank for a value lower than the mortgage. And in another foreclosure (A),
it appeared the mortgages nearly totaled the value of the home, and the bank bid only
$100, but based on the ten mortgages and lines of credit filed against the home, it is
likely the decedent had very little equity. The fourth testate mortgage (C) was a
complicated estate with significant debts in addition to a $128,000 mortgage taken out
in 2003. The bid by the bank at the foreclosure auction was $75,100 which is probably
what remained on the 2003 mortgage, even though the house was worth roughly
$200,000. The bank later sold the home for $156,000. Thus, the heirs may have lost
roughly $75,000 in equity in the home by allowing the foreclosure.
83 J’s case is particularly problematic, as she bought her home in 2002 and paid the
$40,800 mortgage off entirely in 2008 by taking out an adjustable rate mortgage for
$118,500 which reflected roughly the entire value of the home at that time. When she
died in 2011, she stopped making payments on the adjustable-rate mortgage and it was
foreclosed upon in 2013, at which the mortgage company bid only $49,000 to regain
the property and then sold it a few months later for $19,900. This was clearly a case of
a homeowner being caught up in the refinancing frenzy of the real estate bubble. The
fact that she received a loan for $118,000 is not surprising given that the fair market
value of nearby homes are in that range today. But assuming she only owed $49,000 at
the time of the foreclosure, this suggests that she, and her heirs, lost over half the value
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home purchases at the height of the housing bubble, but these intestate
foreclosures showed some potential loss of equity nonetheless.
Although these eight or nine foreclosures represent a majority of the
total foreclosures, they also are disproportionately distributed. Overall,
80% (four out of five) of the testate foreclosures resulted in little loss to
the beneficiaries because the decedents appeared to have had very little
equity in these homes. These were not the problematic foreclosures. On
the other hand, only 40% of the intestate foreclosures were of this
unproblematic type. The following table identifies specific
characteristics of each of these fifteen forced sales.
Table 7. Testate and Intestate Foreclosures
Testate Foreclosures
Date of
Death

Date of
FMV of
Acquisition Home
of Home

A

7/9/2012

B

10/31/201 1994
2

Legal
Action

Bid
Date of
Later
Amount Foreclo- Sold For
sure/Tax
Sale

1973 as T/E 106,652 Foreclosure 100
186,602 Foreclosure 63,000
against son
after
decedent’s
death

Size of
Probate
Estate

3/2015

85,900

12/2014

179,900 90,710 (HS)

5/2016

156,000 81,800 + HS

C 6/7/2013

1976 as T/E 201,463 Foreclosure 75,100

D 6/13/09

2007 as T/E 243,446 H x-fer to
258,000 4/2012
bank in lieu
of
foreclosure

3,049

187,500 19,000

of her home, although it is likely the home was hard hit during the recession. In K, the
decedent acquired his mobile home in 2005 at the height of the market, paying $79,500
and taking out a mortgage for $78,271. Shortly after his death in 2013 his heirs failed
to make mortgage payments and the bank foreclosed in 2016, acquiring the property
for a bid amount of $54,200. Another intestate foreclosure also involved a line of credit
that was at least as high as the value of the home taken out in 2007 (M) and the home
was transferred to the mortgage company in lieu of foreclosure where it appears the
mortgage was close to, if not higher than, the value of the home. And in the last
foreclosure (O), the decedent had taken out a $100,000 mortgage in 2004, a $74,000
line of credit in 2005, and another mortgage for $50,000 in 2007 on a home worth
roughly $180,000. The bank bid only $100,000, however, which may indicate that the
heirs lost nearly half the value of the home in equity assuming half of the three
mortgages and lines of credit had been repaid. But the children may not have been able
to continue paying on the home until the value rebounded enough to sell it and recoup
any value. The bank, however, turned around and sold the house a few months after
the foreclosure for $181,000.
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4/30/2010 1980 as
T/E, built
home in
1982

373,383 Bank acq’d

301,000 5/2014
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290,000 30,000

Intestate Foreclosures
F

2/14/13

2007 for
147,000

264,550 Foreclosure 100
in 2014 $131K
mortgage

2014

65,000 Unk –
then
owned
285,000 commercial
properties
and
businesses

G 8/20/08

1989 w/
33K
mortgage

76,824

2/2011

26,000

H 6/5/13

1993

180,224 Foreclosure
in 2016
against 2
kids. Had
224K
mortgages
since 2004

I

12/31/11

2002 w/
61K
mortgage

73,920

J

4/8/11

Foreclosure 100
in 2011,
21K owed
on loan

25,000

100,100 8/30/2016 181,000 120,000
but no
doc
stamps

Foreclosure 35,100
in 2016 lists
debt at 67K
but only
41k is
principal,
26K are
costs

2016

43,000

85,000

2002

47,800

Foreclosure 49,000

3/19/13

19,900

26,000

K 7/22/13

2005

64,334

Foreclosure 54,193

7/6/2016

32,500

1,100

L

1991

103,102 Foreclosure 52,500
but no
doc
stamps

7/6/2017

86,000

150,000

2006

87,343

Foreclosure QC in 2011
lieu of
foreclos
ure

35,000

Unk

Tax Sale

3/6/13

M 10/22/12

N 6/27/08

Unknown

88,558

O 9/9/08

2003

180,795 Foreclosure 100

8,800

9/20/2013 Not sold 7,000
11/2010

65,600 Unk
then
180,000

The mere fact that there were twice as many foreclosures and tax sales
of intestate properties than testate properties, and that there were
proportionally more testate real properties, shows that foreclosures hit
the intestate decedents harder than the testate decedents. Sixteen
percent of intestate real property-holding decedents lost their homes,
while only 6% of testate decedents did. And proportionally more of the
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intestate foreclosures were of the problematic kind in which significant
amounts of equity were likely lost. Only one (20%) of the testate
foreclosures seemed to involve significant loss of equity, while five or
six (50%-60%) of the intestate foreclosures involved significant loss of
equity, including the tax sale in which all equity was lost for a tax debt
of less than $9,000. Admittedly, each property is unique, and it matters
when the decedents acquired their homes, how much equity they had
in them, and whether their heirs could afford to sell before foreclosure
happened. Moreover, it also depended on the decedents themselves, and
whether they had a long decline of incapacity during which no one was
paying their bills, or whether they had family members or guardians
who could manage the property to avoid foreclosures. The younger
average age of intestate decedents also means that their heirs were
probably in a less economically stable position to take over and pay their
parent’s debts to avoid loss of equity in these homes.
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
By focusing in on the subsequent sales and foreclosures or tax sales,
I have found a sobering pattern in which the lower-value homes of the
intestate decedents are sold off, often for significantly below fair market
value, or are at risk of forced sale at double or triple the rates of the
homes of testate decedents. Intestate decedents had more heirs, leading
to more fractionation, their real property was more likely to be the only
reason for going through probate, they had very little other property,
and they had nearly quadruple the rate of foreclosures. They had done
far less planning, so there were delays in retitling their property where
nearly a third of the testate decedents had their real property pass
smoothly to their survivors without delay. All of these factors
compound to create a downward wealth cycle for the generally poorer
intestate decedents and an upward wealth cycle for the generally
wealthier testate decedents. Although I am not suggesting causation
here, there is significant correlation between intestacy and less wealth
— a correlation that prompts us to examine whether there are points of
intervention, or possible legal and policy changes that might disrupt the
cycle perhaps at the point when the wealth transfer is happening.
Although the data set is not large enough to draw large-scale
conclusions about home values and the likely disposition of intestate
and testate decedents’ homes, we can see how the wealth gap may be
exacerbated by intestacy when we consider the size of inheritances and
their likelihood of fractionation or partition. If we examine the heirs
and beneficiaries of these estates, we also see the wealth gap problem.
Intestate decedents had, on average, 2.78 heirs while testate decedents
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had, on average, 1.8 beneficiaries. The greater the fractionation of the
intestate estates naturally result in smaller inheritances.
Further, considering the median age of intestate decedents is nearly
twenty years younger than their testate counterparts, we can assume
that their heirs are roughly twenty years younger as well. The larger
inheritances of the testate beneficiaries come at a point in time when
their beneficiaries likely don’t need the money and they can put it to the
benefit of grandchildren, who are likely to be college-aged or older. The
smaller inheritances of the intestate beneficiaries come at a point in time
when the beneficiaries themselves are likely to need it for payment of
debts or living expenses for themselves and their, likely, minor children.
And $30,000 doesn’t go nearly as far as a $120,000 inheritance,
especially if the recipient is in a very different economic position and
can invest rather than spend the money.
An analysis of the real property records of the intestate and testate
decedents reveals that the intestate decedents controlled much less
wealth, and when they owned homes (which they were less likely to
do), those homes were valued at significantly less than the homes of the
testate decedents. When they were sold by the survivors, they were
more likely to be sold at significantly below fair market value, and when
the heirs received their inheritances, they were substantially less than
the inheritances of the testate beneficiaries. In considering possible
interventions to prevent the tax sales and foreclosures, to encourage
protecting the value of this wealth, and setting up procedures to
maximize its chance of being leveraged by the beneficiaries to build
their own wealth, we can easily get quite discouraged. Freedom of
alienation of property is a fundamental bedrock of our legal system. And
we certainly cannot insist that grandma’s home be kept in the family
and passed on for generations as was the custom of our colonial
forebears. With our global economy and the unprecedented mobility of
our residents, we cannot assume that children will live even in the same
state as their parents, will take over their parents’ businesses or homes,
or will need the inheritance given greater investment in education. With
greater longevity and more investment in human capital by parents,
many children don’t need an inheritance and, when they are likely to
finally get one, they are most likely able to save it. But for many working
class and minority individuals, the family home may be the only asset
of significance, and its loss can be devastating to the next generation’s
ability to scramble up the economic ladder. With the wealth gap
increasing to its highest point since the 1920s, it is understandable why
scholars and policymakers are intensely focused on the myriad ways to
intervene in the downward wealth cycle.
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There are a few things we can do, both legally and policy-wise, to
prevent the loss of this wealth. Legally, we can prohibit tax sales and
foreclosures of property owned by a decedent for a period, perhaps up
to two years after death. This would give the heirs time to come to grips
with their loss, sell the home to pay off the mortgage or tax debts, or
pay off the debts themselves in order to protect the equity in these
homes. Of course, in two years a home in Florida can easily deteriorate
with the mildew, weeds, and hurricanes. So someone needs to take an
interest in these homes. If an heir is not maintaining it with the
intention of living in it himself or selling it, then perhaps the court could
appoint a real estate protector who could be given authority to lease the
house and use the rental income to provide maintenance. If there is no
heir stepping up, then the real estate protector could perhaps sell the
home to pay any back debts and ensure that the house is sold for
maximum value. Like a guardian ad litem, a real property protector
could be a fiduciary with the task of leveraging real property assets for
the benefit of heirs. They could be prohibited from selling below a
certain threshold, like 70% of fair market value, or perhaps they would
be held to the fiduciary standard of a prudent investor.
It is unlikely that anyone would recommend that we return to the old
days of primogeniture when the family estate passed to the eldest son,
leaving the daughters and younger sons to seek their fortunes through
marriage, the church, or the army. But creating ways to encourage
people to make wills, or to use joint tenancies or enhanced life estate
deeds with their beneficiaries can simplify the transition from one
generation to the next. Reid Weisbord has suggested that people should
be able to fill out a simple form will every year when they do their
taxes.84 If there were a simpler mechanism for enabling homeowners to
pass their property smoothly outside of probate, that alone would likely
lessen the chances that the property will be fractionated and sold, or
lost through foreclosures and tax sales. By encouraging homeowners to
do even a modest amount of planning before they die, their homes can
now be passed outside of probate more smoothly and quickly. TOD
deeds are permissible in twenty-eight states plus the District of
Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands.85 These deeds allow a landowner
to simply designate a taker who will receive the property at death,
retaining for the grantor all power and control to alienate, mortgage,
and manage during life. At least five states, including Florida, allow the

84 Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy,
53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 920 (2012).
85 See Wright, Beneficiary Deeds, supra note 33 (manuscript at 2).
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use of enhanced life estate deeds to effectively accomplish the same
thing. In my research, I found no decedent who had used one of these
deeds, although I did see that numerous heirs and beneficiaries did,
perhaps prompted by their recent experiences with the probate system.
If these deed forms were made more easily available through the
property recorder’s office, and if there was more education about their
use, landowners could ensure that their real property never passes
through probate. More importantly, landowners could designate a
single taker to avoid fractionation and ensure better maintenance and
management of the property.
There are other things that could help, such as reducing the stigma of
talking about death and property succession so decedents and their
heirs can better plan for that fateful day.86 If there were better
educational programs to inform low-income homeowners of the
importance of estate planning and of protecting their home equity from
generation to generation, then perhaps there will be less intestacy. But
that also means making different options available and informing
people of their legal implications. Flyers could be included with tax bills
or mortgage bills encouraging people to make a will and designate who
should be responsible to maintain the real property in case of incapacity
and at death. More importantly, if people are not in a position to benefit
from the non-probate revolution, either because they don’t want to
make wills or are skeptical of the legal system, then perhaps the probate
courts could intervene more regularly. A real estate protector program
for intestate, pro bono probates could help, as could an appointed
realtor whose job it is to act as a fiduciary for the estate to manage and
dispose of the real property in the best way possible. It isn’t necessary
to have snoopy neighbors going through the belongings of the recently
deceased to identify their assets, but it could be advantageous for people
below a certain economic threshold to have some professional help
maneuvering through the probate process.
There is no question that as people age, their ability to maintain their
property declines. Homes fall into disrepair, mortgage payments may go
unpaid in order to pay medical bills, and many elderly people retreat
from society. Without children and grandchildren checking up and
ensuring that bills are paid, the house is maintained, and grandma’s
needs are met, all of her assets become vulnerable to loss and
destruction. With the loss of those assets, the next generation starts out
well behind their middle-class peers. We cannot ensure that everyone
lives to 100, nor can we ensure that everyone will own a well86

See Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 26, at 370.
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maintained, high-value home at death. But we can make better efforts
to help ensure that hard-earned wealth is not lost from generation to
generation. Breaking the wealth-destruction cycle should be a priority
for a legal system that places property rights and freedom of testation at
its core. For having property rights should mean having the right to
have that property protected as it passes from generation to generation
and not be neglected by our current probate system.

